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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH R. APP. P. Rule A(a)
Appellate jurisdiction to decide the above-captioned matter
is granted to the Utah Court of Appeals under authority of U.C.A.
78-2-2(4) (ch. 1953, as amended). Petitioner/Appellant was charged
by the state of Utah in the First Judicial District Court, Box
Elder County with murder in the second degree, a felony of the
first degree, and a jury verdict of guilty was pronounced on
February 20, 1990. A timely notice of appeal was filed in the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 f'Appeal As of
Right: How Taken". The Utah Supreme Court pursuant to U.C.A.
78-2-2(3)(i) has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the
District Court involving a conviction of a first degree felony and
under authority of subsection (4) the Supreme Court has the
discretionary power to transfer to the Utah Court of Appeals any
of the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate
jurisdiction.

In this matter the Supreme Court exercised it power

to transfer the above-captioned to the Utah Court of Appeals thus
granting to the Court jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD
OF APPELLATE REVIEW FOR EACH ISSUE Wttft SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
UTAH R, APP. P. RULE 24(a)(5)
1.

Did the following acts of the Box Elder County Attorney

constitute reversible error either through improper statements
made individually or cummulatively, and did the trial court commit
reversible error by denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial
based upon the acts set forth in subparagraphs a. and b. below:
a.

by stigmitizing the Appellant as a "criminal11?

b.

by twice asserting, without supporting evidence, in

the closing argument that Appellant and Co-Defenant Ray
Cabututan conspired to fabricate their accounts of the events
that occurred on October 25, 1989.
c.

repeatedly expressing his opinion that the

Appellant and Co-Defendant Ray Cabututan were "liars",
"lying", or "not telling the truth" in closing argument?
d.

twice referencing Co-Defendant Ray Cabututan1s

conviction for the same offense charged against Appellant?
e.

twice commenting upon the strength of the evidence

as compared to that presented in other murder cases?
f.

misstating, in closing argument, the testimony of

the State's eyewitnesses regarding the crucial issue of
Appellant's level of intoxication?
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g.

disparaging the legitimate defense strategy of

admitting a lesser degree of guilt and seeking acquittal of
the higher degree by stating, "Obviously, this defendant
would love to be convicted of something less than second
degree murder?
h.

stating, "I would submit to you that if [Appellant]

was trying to help [the victim], it was just to help him out
of this life and nothing else[,]ff and "[the Appellant is] out
there just having a good old time beating [the victim]11.
i.

vouching for the credibility of Richard Anderson,

the State of Utah's key eyewitness?
The standard of review in regard to improper prosecutorial
statements is whether the prosecutor's remarks brought to the
attention of the jurors matters that they would not be justified
in considering in reaching their verdict, and, if so, whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so prejudiced
the jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent
the misconduct.

State v Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (UT 1988).

Rulings on whether the conduct of the prosecution warranted a
mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 190 However, the error alleged in subparagraph (f) above
can be held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See State v

Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1124 (UT 1982); State v Verde, 770 P.2d
116, 121 n.8 (UT 1989).
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To the extent that any of these errors, specifically those
alleged in subparagraphs c.,d.,e.,f.,g.,h., and i. above, were not
brought to the attention of the trial court, this Court may
nevertheless take notice of the error if it is a plain error
affecting a substantial right of the defendant.

Utah R. Evid.

103(d). Lastly, cumulative error exists if the cumulative impact
of substantial errors prejudiced Appellant's right to a fair
trial.
2.

See State v Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (UT 1986).
Was Appellant denied his United States Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right and State of Utah
constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, a
fair trial, due process, and equal protection as a result of the
following acts of the trial court:
a,

initially refusing to appoint, and then belatedly

appointing a private investigator to assist Appellant's trial
counsel in pretrial investigation and preparation?
b.

denying Appellant's Motion To Appoint Psychological

and Expert Personnel and Motion To Allow Psychological
Testing and Mental Evaluation for the purpose of establishing
by expert testimony that the Appellant could not and did not
form the intent to commit second degree murder due to
voluntary intoxication?
3.

Did the trial court violate Appellant's United States

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional right to effective
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assistance of counsel, or otherwise commit reversible error by
denying Appellant's Motion For Continuance of the trial date set?
The standard of review is, in part, strictly a matter of
constitutional law and judicial administration, see Hintz v Beto,
379 F.2d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 1967), and, in part, whether the trial
court clearly abused its discretion.

State v Creviston, 646 P.2d

750, 752 (UT 1982).
4.

Did Appellant's trial counsel fail to provide Appellant

with effective assistance of counsel as required by the United
States Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution by
virtue of one or more of the following acts and omissions:
a.

by failing to timely file Appellant's Motion To

Appoint Psychiatrist and Expert Personnel and Motion To Allow
Psychological Testing and Mental Evaluation?
b.

failing to adequately investigate and prepare the

case for trial?
c.

failing to call character witnesses on the

Appellant's behalf?
d.

failing to object to many prejudicial and improper

statements made by the prosecuting attorney during closing
arguments?.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the
Appellant must show, (1) that Appellant's trial counsel rendered a
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that a
reasonable probability exists that except for ineffective
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assistance of counsel, the result would have been different.
State v Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (UT 1985).

In other words, was

the Appellant prejudiced by his counsels performance to such an
extent that the trial cannot be relied upon as producing a just
result?
5.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in referring

to instructions already given to the jury in response to three
separate jury requests for supplemental instructions relating to
the issue of intent?

The standard of review is whether the trial

court's actions plainly resulted in a miscarriage of justice?
State v Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 93 N.5 (UT 1981).
6.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in allowing

the jury to deliberate for eight and one-half hours until 1:20
a.m. after a fourth full day of trial?

The standard of review is

whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v Lactad, 761
P.2d 23 (Utah Ap. 1988).
7.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing

to allow the jury to view the scene of the crime?

The standard of

review is whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v
Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741 (UT 1945).
8.

Was there cumulative error made in this case, sufficient

to warrant a reversal of Appellant's conviction?

Cumulative error

exists if the cumulative impact of substantial errors prejudiced
Appellant's right to a fair trial.
498, 501-02 (UT 1986).
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See State v Rammel, 721 P.2d

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION

IS DETERMINATIVE - UTAHft.APP. P. RULE 24(aTTF7
The interpretation of the following constitutional
provisions, statutes and rules is determinative of the issues
stated:
Issue 1:

Utah R. Criminal Procedure Rule 30
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Issue 2:

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Article I, Section 12 Constitution of Utah
U.C.A. 77-32-1(3)
U.C.A. 76-5-203(1)
U.C.A. 77-14-3

Issue 3:

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

Issue 4:

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
U.C.A. 77-14-3

Issue 5:

No constitutional provision or statute is
determinative as to the issue presented

Issue 6:

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution

Issue 7:

Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
Utah R. Criminal Procedure Rule 30
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE - UTAH R. APP. P. RULE 24(a)(7)
The Criminal Information filed against Appellant in the First
Circuit Court of Box Elder County, Utah, charged Appellant and
three co-defendants, Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, and Billy Cayer,
with committing the crime of Murder In The Second Degree , A Felony
Of The First Degree, on the night of October 25, 1989, in
violation of U.C.A. 76-5-203 (1953 as amended).

The defendant's

allegedly, jointly and in concert, caused the death of Miguel
(Mike) Ramirez resulting from numerous blows from the defendant's
feet, hands, and a wrench, wielded solely by Ray Cabututan, during
a fight that occurred both inside and outside of the trailer
houses where the defendant's were employed,, All of the
defendants, as well as the State's three eyewitnesses to the
alleged crime, Pichard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie Apadaca,
resided in a small trailer camp resting on a remote piece of land
located on the Northwest shore of the Great: Salt Lake and owned by
Western Brine Shrimp Company, which employed all of the
defendant's and eyewitnesses.
The evidence is undisputed that the night of October 25, 1989
was dark, cloudy, and a moonless night; the only outside lighting
for tens of miles around the camp was a dim light emanating
through the door of one or two of the trailers. Due to the dim
lighting, only one of the State's three eyewitnesses, Richard
Anderson, was able to positively identify the Appellant as being
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amoung the three or four people, other than the victim, that
participated in the latter part of the fight that occurred outside
the trailers, when the fight escalated and weapons were used.
Appellant properly raised the following defenses, including
voluntary intoxication as precluding him from forming the
requisite intent for second degree murder; self-defense because
the victim wielded a knife, and non-participation in the major
part of the fight that occurred outside the trailers, when weapons
were used upon the victim.

After a separate jury trial lasting

four days, the Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder
and sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years to life.
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR RFVIEW
UTAH R. APP. P. RULE 24(a)(77
According to the testimony of Eddie Apadaca, one of the
State's three eyewitnesses, that on the evening of October 25,
1989, the Appellant, along with eight other employees of Western
Brine Shrimp Company, were present and residing in three trailer
houses located on the company's property on the northwest side of
the Great Salt Lake.

Of the nine crew members, Richard Anderson

and Eric Tilley, the State's other eyewitnesses, and Sherman
Gallardo resided in trailer #1. Eddie Apadaca, Ray Cabututan, and
Miguel (Mike) Ramirez, the victim, resided in trailer #2.
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Billy Cayer, Don Brown, and the Appellant resided in trailer #3.
Trial transcript (hereinafter "T". at 84-87).

At approximately

9:45 p.m., the Appellant went to trailer #2 and asked Eddie
Apadaca to come over to trailer #3. When Eddie Apadaca entered
trailed #3, the residents of trailer #3 as well as Ray Cabututan,
Eddie Apadacafs roommate, were drinking whiskey and vodka.

The

Appellant, in a friendly manner, offered Eddie Apadaca a drink.
Don Brown accused Eddie Apadaca of acting like he was the foreman
of the crew.

Ray Catubutan also expressed his displeasure with

Eddie Apadaca for failing to help Ray Catvibutan with some work and
in a drunken state started hitting Apadaca and dazed him with a
blow to his head with a sharpening stone, making things pretty
blurry.

(T.87-91, 104-106).

Eddie Apadaca then ran back to his trailer #2. At this point
in time, Eddie Apadaca's story begins to differ materially from
the Appellant's testimony, which is set forth below.

Shortly

thereafter, defendant's Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, Billy Cayer, and
Appellant all entered trailer #2 at approximately the same time.
Ray Cabututan was seen holding nunchunks. Mike Ramirez jumped
between Eddie Apadaca and the four men.

The Appellant stated they

should get the knife in Mike Ramirez's pocket.
Ramirez and Don Brown pulled out knifes.

Then, both Mike

After Mike Ramirez

dropped his knife, Don Brown folded and put away his knife, then
Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, and the Appellant escorted Mike Rameriz
out of trailer #2. Billy Cayer remained with Eddie Apadaca in
trailer #2. (T. 91-96).
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Meanwhile Billy Cayer, who was drunk, tried to hit Eddie
Apadaca several times. Eddie Apadaca testified he could hear Mike
Rameriz being hit. A few minutes later Don Brown came back into
trailer #2 and told Billy Cayer to leave Eddie Apadaca alone, and
to gather his things and leave camp. (T. 96-97).
As Eddie Apadaca exited trailer #2 and ran between trailers
#1 and #2, he saw Mike Ramirez lying on the grounds being kicked
by a blur of people standing around him.

The Appellant then asked

Eddie Apadaca if he was going to help his buddy just prior to
striking Eddie Apadaca and knocking him down behind the trailers.
After exiting trailer #2, was the first time that Eddie Apadaca
recalled seeing the Appellant, when Appellant hit him. (T. 97-98,
107).
As soon as Eddie Apadaca returned to his feet, Ray Cabututan
came at him with a wrench in his hand.

Eddie Apadaca took off

running to the north, stumbled over a batch of eggs, and then
heard the Appellant say, "leave him alone11, "let him go", "let's
finish this guy", or something like that. Eddie Apadaca did not
know whether anyone was following him because it was pretty dark.
After running about 60 feet, Eddie Apadaca looked back between the
trailers and saw a blur of more than one person standing around
Mike Ramirez. (T. 98-99).
According to the testimony of Richard Anderson, another
eyewitness, he went to bed that night around 10:00 p.m., contrary
to the testimony of his roommate, Eric Tilley, who says that he
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went to bed around 10:00 p.m., forty-five minutes after Anderson
went to bed.
10:30 p.m.

Richard Anderson was awakened by a commotion around

Eric Tilley was the first person to get up in trailer

#1 and rousted Anderson out of bed.

Richard Anderson stated,

"let's not get involved11, and consequently Richard Anderson, Eric
Tilley, and their roommate Sherman Gallardo waited four or five
minutes before Sherman Gallardo opened the door to their trailer
to look outside. (T. 113-114, 129-31, 165).
Prior to the time the door was opened, Richard Anderson heard
an unidentifiable voice say, "leave this camp before we kill you11.
(T. 115). Eric Tilley and Richard Anderson then followed Sherman
Gallardo and looked out the door after Sherman Gallardo, who said
something to the people outside. (T. 131-21).

Eric Tilley

testified that Sherman Gallardo said, "cool it, Don11, and someone
turned and responded with a threat that, f,if you don't want some
of this, stay inside". (T. 169). Richard Anderson testified that
when the door was first opened, Don Brown swung a crescent wrench
at Richard Anderson and asked him if he wanted some of this. (T.
118).

But Ray Cabututan in contradiction testified that he was

the only person who held the crescent wrench that night. (T. 600).
Richard Anderson testified that the door remained open throughout
the fight; Eric Tilley, however, in a sharp contradiction to
Richard Anderson's testimony testified that the door was closed
after Sherman Gallardo was threatened, and was reopened by Richard
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Anderson only after a period of five to ten minutes. (T. 131-32,
172).
When Richard Anderson first looked out the door, he allegedly
saw Don Brown, Ray Cabututan, Billy Cayer and the Appellant
kicking and beating Mike Ramirez. (T. 116-117).

In sharp

contradiction, Eric Tilley, who was standing in front of Richard
Anderson, testified that he saw only three people standing around
one person lying on the ground and that those three people were
Ray Cabututan, Billy Cayer, and either Don Brown or Appellant, who
look alike. Since they possess the same build and color of hair.
(T. 128, 158-59, 168). Because it was dark, Eric Tilley testified
he was having trouble figuring out the identity of the victim
lying on the ground and could not determine if the third standing
person was Don Brown or the Appellant. (T. 159, 168-69, 174).
B.ichard Anderson, in contradiction to Eric Tilleyfs testimony
stated that he was able to see the persons and events by virtue of
light emanating from the open doors of trailers #1 and #2. Eric
Tilley testified that only one dim stove light was on in trailer
#1. (T. 116, 445-47).

Ray Cabututan testified he never saw any

lights on in trailer #1 and stated that he could not identify
people because it was pitch black that night, as there was no moon
due to an overcast sky. (T. 590, 594, 597, 599-600).
Richard Anderson testified that he did not see all of the
rest of the fight because Sherman Gallardo and he took turns
looking out the door.

Richard Anderson also testified that the
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Appellant did most of the beating during the times he was
watching.

The fight gradually moved from the front of trailer #2

to behind the amphibian parked in front of trailer #1.

Richard

Anderson testified he saw the Appellant choking Mike Ramirez and
saw him hitting him in the face behind the amphibian vehicle.

He

also saw Ray Cabututan hit Mike Ramirez several times with a
wrench, prepare to stab Mike Ramirez with a knife, and then swung
the knife at Sherman Gallardo when he said stop it.
Significantly, Richard Anderson testified he never saw the
Appellant with a weapon. (T. 117-19, 132, 138-40, 142-43, 151-52).
During the fight Richard Anderson testified he heard the
Appellant say to Mike Ramirez, ffyoufre blind in one eye and can't
see out of the other one"; the Appellant repeatedly said ffyou
shouldn't cut my partner Billy, I'm going to beat you for this";
"I'm going to kill you for stabbing my partner"; and someone said
"he's not breathing".

Ray Cabututan, on the other hand was in the

same position as Richard Anderson and in sharp contradiction to
the testimony of Richard Anderson testified that he could only
hear the loud generator operating ten to fifteen feet from the
fight. (T. 118-121, 591).
Throughout the fight P.ichard Anderson testified that: he was
emotional and scared.

He considered Don Brown, Ray Cabututan,

Billy Cayer, and the Appellant, who were all pretty drunk, to be
dangerous, because drunks do things they would not ordinarily do.
(T. 134-37, 140).
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Richard Anderson further testified he considered the
Appellant to be pompous and pushy.

He did not care for what the

Appellant stood for. They had been "snooty" to each other and
exchanged angry words over a work-related accident, (T. 153-54).
On the other hand, Richard Anderson liked Billy Cayer and
thought he was a "pleasant gentleman".

Richard Anderson testified

that Billy Cayer disappeared shortly after he began watching the
fight. (T. 117, 153).
Although the fight lasted approximately 45 minutes, according
to Anderson, all three of the occupants and witnesses of trailer
#1 were military veterans armed with knifes and a large
two-by-four, yet paradoxically, and to their shame no one in
trailer #1 assisted Mike Ramirez. P.ichard Anderson testified he
thought that the end result of the fight wuold be similar to other
fights he had observed; namely, that Mike Ramirez would be
battered and bruised, but otherwise allright.

Richard Anderson

testified he did not think the fight was likely to result in the
death of Mike Ramirez.

Similarly, Eric Tilley stated he would

have tried to help Ramirez if he had thought the fight was likely
to result in the death of Mike Ramirez. (T. 121, 134, 137-138,
448).
The time discrepancy of the time the fight lasted, with the
testimony of Richard Anderson, was highlighted when Eric Tilley
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testified it lasted no more than 15-20 minutes, and Mike Ramirez
then got up, went into his trailer and washed himself off. Later,
around midnight, Richard Anderson stated he saw the Appellant
sitting on the amphibian.

Thereafter, at about 2:30 a.m., Don

Brown came over to trailer #1 to ask the occupants if they had
seen anything, and Richard Anderson also saw the Appellant outside
at this time. Don Brown and the Appellant were then seen drinking
at the kitchen table of trailer #3. (T. 121-124, 160).
Around 5:00 a.m. , Richard Anderson heard a knock on the door
of trailer #1. When Richard Anderson and Sherman Gallardo opened
the door, Mike Rameriz was seen sitting on the pallet outside the
door.

He asked them to call 911; told then he couldn't breath,

and asked for a drink of water.

After drinking some water, Mike

Ramirez collapsed and died. (T. 125-26).
The Appellant, who is 27 years old, testified that he is an
alcoholic and has been a very heavy drinker since he was about 16
years old.

On the night in question, in conformity with his

alcoholic character, he commenced his drinking around 7:30-8:00
p.m. from a half-gallon bottle of Jack Daniels whiskey, a
half-gallon bottle of vodka, and six beers that Don Brown had
brought back from town.

The Appellant steadily drank a 12 ounce

cans of beer, 4-5 ounces of vodka, and 16-25 ounces of Jack
Daniels prior to asking Eddie Apadaca to come over to trailer #1.
(T. 458-470).
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While Eddie Apadaca was in trailer #3, the Appellant drank 4
more ounces of Jack Daniels. After Eddie Apadaca went back to
trailer #2, Billy Cayer left trailer #3, followed by Ray
Cabututan.

Shortly, thereafter, the Appellant went looking for

Billy Cayer and found him and Ray Cabututan in trailer #2 along
with Eddie Apadaca and Mike Ramirez. When the Appellant entered
the open door of trailer #2, he testified he saw Mike Ramirez
holding a knife; Ray Cabututan was rummaging in the closet, and
Billy Cayer was on a bunk trying to maul Eddie Apadaca.

Don Brown

came into trailer #2 about five or ten minutes later. (T.
470-473).
Ray Cabututan then pulled nunchuks out of the closet. The
Appellant grabbed the nunchuks from Cabututan and threw them
towards the trailer door, saying, "nunchuks was not needed11. The
Appellant then told Mike Ramirez that the Appellant was going to
get his friend (Cayer) out of there and proceeded toward Billy
Cayer.

At that time, Don Brown walked in the door and said to

Mike Ramirez, "why don't you put your knife down?". (T. 474-75,
607).

When Mike Ramirez looked at Don Brown, the Appellant then

punched Mike Ramirez in the side of his face. Ramirez fell on a
bunk, and the Appellant then jumped on Ramirez, grabbed the hand
with the knife, and punched Ramirez four or five more times in the
head. Mike Ramirez's nose and lip started to bleed.

Ramirez then

got up and ran out the door. Ray Cabututan confirms that Mike
Ramirez came out of the door by himself. (T. 474-75, 591-92).
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It then took the Appellant approximately five minutes to get
Billy Cayer off of Eddie Apadaca and out of trailer #2. When the
Appellant and Billy Cayer exited trailer #2, the Appellant
testified that he saw no one, but heard scuffling by the barrels
in front of trailer #2. The Appellant then looked at Billy
Cayer's arm, because Ray Cabututan had said, just prior to the
Appellant grabbing and throwing the nunchukas away, that Mike
Ramirez had stuck Billy Cayer with a knife. Billy Cayer's arm was
bleeding, but not very badly, so Appellant said, "shit don't you
cool out, because he's not hurt that badly". (T. 476-79, 586).
Eddie Apadaca then came out of trailer #2 and said something
derogatory to Billy Cayer and the Appellant.

The Appellant

followed Eddie Apadaca between the trailers to the west side of
the trailers and punched Apadaca, who fell down.

At the time the

Appellant punched Eddie Apadaca he testified that he saw no one
else behind the trailers.

Eddie Apadaca got up quickly; ran to

the north with the Appellant chasing him until he heard Apadaca
run into the eggs covered with a tarp. (T. 479-81).
As appellant came around the north side of trailer #1, he
testified he saw Mike Ramirez lying face down and moaning about a
foot behind the amphibian in front of trailer #1. The Appellant
walked over, straddled Mike Ramirez, placed his hands and arms
under Ramirez's shoulders, and tried to lift him.
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As he did so,

someone came up and kicked Mike Ramirez in the face. The
Appellant said, "don't do thatM, and pushed Mike Ramirez's face
toward the ground to protect him from the unidentifiable person
now walking away, (T. 482-84).
It took the Appellant a couple of minutes to lift Mike
Ramirez up before he walked Mike Ramirez to his trailer.

In

response to Mike Ramirez saying he was dizzy, the Appellant
suggested that Mike Ramirez lie down. Mike Ramirez then sat on
the bed and the Appellant exited trailer #2 and went back to
trailer #3. Before waking up the next morning, the last thing the
Appellant remembers is having another drink when he returned to
trailer #3. (T. 484-85) .
The Appellant testified that he did not know how he acquired
blood on his clothes and tennis shoes that night, although it was
his rational and logical belief that the blood came from his fight
with Mike P.amirez in trailer #2 and from assisting Mike Ramirez to
his feet and back to the bed in trailer #2. Appellant testified
he hit Mike Ramirez only with his fist, only in trailer #2, and
only for the purpose of disarming him and getting his friend Billy
Cayer out of the trailer. (T. 484-88, 493-95).
In the morning the Appellant was told that Mike Ramirez was
dead.

After examing Mike Rameriz, the Appellant grabbed a shovel

and entered the ATV vehicle, as he normally would do, to drive out
of camp to a spot where he could go to the bathroom.
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Richard

Anderson and Eric Tilley testified that this procedure was common
practice at the camp. After remembering that an outhouse had been
built in the past week and completed the day before, the Appellant
turned the ATV around to head back to camp, at which point, the
ATV stalled.

As the appellant got out of the ATV, he saw the

police arriving and threw down the shovel, (T. 145, 175, 490-92,
511-12).
Based upon the Appellants testimony as to the amount of
liquor he drank, Dr. Brian Finkle, an expert witness on the
effects of alcohol as a toxic agent, testified regarding the blood
alcohol level of a hypothetical person in the Appellant's
circumstances.

Dr. Finkle conservatively estimated that such a

persons blood alcohol level would have reached a very high 0.382,
and certainly no less than 0.30%, at the time the Appellant
entered trailer #2. (T. 538-546).

Dr. Finkle further testified

that it was his expert opinion that alcohol severely affects one's
mental capacity, which involves making judgments and decisions,
and understanding the consequences of ones actions.

The ability

to process information from multiple inputs, process it, and then
make a judgment or decision therefrom is very badly impaired even
at very low alcohol levels.

Substantially impaired, also, is the

ability to perceive or recognize the severity of a fight and the
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details thereof, such as the existence and extent of injuries to
oneself and others, and the danger from something, such as a
knife.

An intoxicated person is likely to be operating purely at

an emotional, instinctive level, as rational and logical thought
falls away due to alcohol intoxication. (T. 554-565, 571-573).
Dr. Finkel further noted that someone, such as the Appellant, who
has been drinking heavily and steadily for over a decade, will
develop a very considerable capacity to disguise the subjective,
observable effects of alcohol on walking, talking, and the like.
Nevertheless, at blood alcohol levels of 0.30% and above, an
alcoholic may black out, i.e. experience a loss of memory, and be
unable to disguise the alcohol's effects. Any memory loss would
occur gradually as the person becomes more intoxicated so that
person would more easily remember the first, rather than the last,
drinks taken. (T. 551-552, 567, 570).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT - UTAH R. APP. P. RULE 24(a)(8)
The Box Elder County Attorney committed plain error in
repeatedly violating his prosecutorial duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a unjust conviction.

On

numerous occasions, during closing argument, the Box Elder County
Attorney failed to limit his argument to the facts in evidence and
legitimate inferences to be drawn therefrom; instead he unduly
relied upon expressions of personal opinion, inflammatory remarks
and facts not taken in evidence.
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The trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant's
Motion For Mistrial based upon the Box Elder County Attorneys
improper and inflammatory statements made during closing
statements.

The trial court violated Appellant's constitutional

right to a fair trial and committed reversible error in
effectively denying the indigent Appellant the right to prepare an
adequate defense, namely by not timely appointing to the defendant
the assistance of a private investigator and a court appointed
psychiatrist.

The need for psychiatric evaluation was crucial in

light of the Appellants severe intoxication, and particularly
where the State of Utah placed Appellant's mental state at issue
by charging him with second degree murder.
Appellant's trial counsel made a timely objection to the
trial date set by the District Court Judge; gave necessary notice
for a Motion For Continuance, and made a reasonable effort to have
the trial date rescheduled for good cause.

The denial of

Appellant's Motion For Continuance of the trial date severely
impaired Appellant's defense counsels ability to adequately
prepare, especially for cross-examination of the State's
eyewitnesses based upon their numerous prior and contemporary
conflicting statements.

Consequently, the trial court violated

Appellant's United States Sixth Amendment constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel and abused its discretion in
denying a trial continuance to allow counsel adequate time to
prepare.
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If the trial court is not found by the Court to be
responsible for denying Appellant effective assistance of counsel,
then this Court must find that Appellant's trial counsel was
responsible for a violation of the United States Constitution
Sixth Amendment and Article I Section 12, Constitution of Utah
right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to timely file
a motion for psychiatric evaluation, and to adequately and in
great scathing detail cross-examine the State's three eyewitnesses
for the purpose of making clear to the jury the sharp
discrepancies in the eyewitness testimony as it effected the
Appellant.

Appellant's defense counsel also failed to call

character witnesses for the Appellant, despite Appellant's fervent
requests, and defense counsel further failed to object, at all, to
the numerous prosecutorial misstatements made to the jury during
closing argument,
A miscarriage of justice occurred when the trial judge
responded to three jury requests for supplemental instructions
regarding the crucial issue of intent by referring the jury to the
instructions already before the jury, rather than clarifying the
jury questions raised.
Discharge of the jurys responsibility to draw appropriate
inferences from the testimony taken depended solely on discharge
of the trial judges duty to give the jury the required guidance by
a lucid, clear statement of the relevant legal criteria
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encompassed in the jury instructions. Discharge of the jurys fact
finding responsibility also depended upon guidance from
psychiatric testimony regarding the impact of alcohol on the
defendant which they did not receive.
Appellant alleges an abuse of discretion occurred when the
trial court permitted the jury to deliberate for eight and
one-half hours, after four full days of trial, until 1:20 a.m.,
thus, arguably depriving Appellant of the considered judgment of
each juror.
Discharge of the jurys duty to judge the evidence fairly
and render a considered verdict depended upon the jury's view of
the crime scene. The request for a jury view, which the trial
judge refused to allow, further constituted an abuse of the
court's discretion to see that a fair trial had occurred.

The

evidence adduced at trial did not adequately portray the lines of
sight and dim light by which the eyewitnesses were, or were not
able to see the events.

In that setting, without question, sound

judicial discretion should have granted to the jury the right to
view the scene of the homicide for the purpose of assessing the
weight to be given, in particular, to Richard Anderson's
eyewitness testimony in light of the weighty, conflicting
evidence.
Finally, the multiple substantial errors committed by the Box
Elder County Attorney in his closing argument made to the Court,
Appellants trial counsels lack of adequate preperation, and the
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trial court, in many instances, abuse of sound discretion amounted
to cummulative error prejudicing Appellant's right to a fair
trial.

For example, the failure to provide Appellant with a

pre-trial psychiatric evaluation denied the jury two crucial areas
of consideration on a central issue of intent about which the jury
evidenced substantial confusion.

With proper jury instructions

given, it is reasonably probable that the jury would have
acquitted Appellant on the highest charge of second degree murder.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTION COMMITTED NUMEROUS PLAIN ERRORS
AND THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FAILING TO REMEDY SUCH ERRORS BFOUGHT TO ITS
ATTENTION.
In the trial of the Appellant, the Box Elder County Attorney
committed numerous errors; particularly, in his closing argument
that both individually and cummulatively affected the substantial
right of the Appellant to a fair trial requiring reversal of
Appellant's conviction for second degree murder.

The prosecutor

repeatedly violated the prosecutorial and ethical duty to refrain
from improper remarks made to the jury panel which were calculated
to incite a conviction on innuendo and evidence that was never
introduced as part of the trial. The duty of a prosecuting
attorney has been aptly described in Commonwealth v Gilman, 368
A.2d 253 (Pa. 1977) wherein the Pennsylvania high court stated:
lf

[T]he prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer representing
the Commonwealth. His duty is to seek justice, not
just convictions....
29

"Although the prosecutor operates within the
adversary system, it is fundamental that his
obligation is to protect the innocent as well
as to convict the guilty, to guard the rights
of the accused as well as to enforce the
rights of the public.ff
During closing argument, the prosecution has an
obligation to
"...present facts so that the jury can
dispassionately and objectively evaluate the
testimony in a sober and reflective frame of
mind that will produce a judgment warranted by
the evidence and not inspired by emotion or
passion.
The prosecutor's position as both an administrator of
justice and an advocate "gives him a responsibility not
to be vindicative or attempt in any manner to influence
the jury by arousing their prejudices.11 In particular,
the prosecutor must limit his argument to the facts in
evidence and legitimate inferences therefrom11.
(at 257 citations omitted).
Two of the Box Elder County Attorneys statements were brought
to the attention of the trial judge by way of Appellant's oral
motion for a mistrial. (T. 669-70).

The errors of which Appellant

complained to the trial court were: (1) the prosecutor labelled
the Appellant a "criminal11, and (2) the prosecutor repeatedly
suggested to the jury that Appellant and Ray Cabututan, a
co-defendant, who had received a separate trial, conspired to
fabricate stories that would not implicate each other. (T. 628-29,
665, 666). There was never any evidence adduced that a jury could
reasonably infer Ray Cabatutan with the Appellant conspired to
commit perjury.

As more fully discussed below, these and other
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prosecutorial errors require reversal of Appellant's conviction.
The Appellant asserts that the trial courts passive denial of the
motion for mistrial constituted an abuse of discretion and the
prosecutors remarks constituted plain error.
An abuse of discretion occurs when, taking into account any
remedial measures ordered by the trial court, the prejudice to the
defendant still satisfies the standard for reversible error set
forth in Utah R. Crim. P. Rule 30. Errors and defects. The
remedial measures requested, but refused would have obviated the
prejudice.

State v Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 (UT 1987).

The Utah

Supreme Court has ruled in several cases that the Rule 30 standard
"^..affect the substantial rights of a party...." means an error
warrants reversal only if, without the error, there was a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant. Id. at 919.
The likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently
high to undermine confidence in the verdict.

Ld. at 920. The

degree of likelihood required lies somewhere between a "mere
possibility11 and "more probable than not" that the outcome of
trial would have been different. Id. at 920.
The plain error test of Rule 103(d) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence is two-pronged.
1989).

State v Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (UT

First, the error must be an obvious one, one of which the

trial court should have been aware at the time it was committed.
Id. n.ll and; Second, the Appellant must show that there is a
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reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome below
would have been more favorable.

Id. at 122. The second prong is

the same standard courts apply in determining whether an abuse of
discretion has occurred.

This two-pronged test is not rigid in

its application, since the degree of error may well affect the
appellate courts judgment as to the obviousnesss of the error.
Id. n.12.

The plain error rule ultimately involves a balancing

for the need for procedural regularity against the demands of
fairness.
A.
Criminal

The Prosecution's Stigmitization of Appellant as a
The prosecuting attorneys stigmitization of Appellant

as a "criminal11 was an unprofessional expression, inferentially,
of the prosecution's personal belief as to Appellant's guilt.
Gilman, 368 A.2d at 258.

See

It has been held that the prosecution

may not express its personal opinion regarding a defendants guilt,
credibility, or trial strategy.

Consequently, the trial court

should have been aware of the error at the time it was committed
in order to initiate curative action and in this case, as such,
the first prong of the plain error rule is satisfied.
Under similar circumstances, where the prosecutor described
the Appellant as a "hoodlum" to the jury panel, the appellate
court held that the trial court, on its own motion should have
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initiated curative action in regard to the prejudicial remark, and
immediately instructed the jury to disregard the improper remark.
Hall v United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969).

The Hall

court properly reasoned that this type of shorthand
characterization of an accused, not based on evidence, is
especially likely to stick in the minds of the jury and influence
its deliberations. Particularly onerous to concepts of justice and
fair play occurs when the characterization emanates from the
authority of the Sovereign; that is, the Box Elder County
Attorney.
In this case, the trial court did not take curative action
and instruct the jury to disregard the Box Elder County Attorney's
remark that the Appellant was a criminal.

Instead, the trial

court gave added credibility and weight to the prosecutors
statement, implying that Appellant was already presumed guilty, in
stating that the stigmitization of Appellant was a logical
extension of the facts, in that, "if [Appellant] murdered a man,
he's a criminal". (T. 671)

Based upon this deductive logic

exercised by the trial court to the jury panel, the court denied
Appellant's motion for a mistrial without taking any remedial
action.
The standard of the abuse of discretion test and the second
prong of the plain error rule has been met. Based upon the facts
set forth below, Appellant argues that there is a reasonable
likelihood that a more favorable outcome of the jury verdict could
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have occurred in absence of the error because of:
(1)

the strong likelihood that the egregious "criminal"

stigmitization of the Appellant influenced the jury deliberations;
(2)

the Appellant had asserted the defense that he was

incapable of forming the necessary intent to commit second degree
murder due to his voluntary intoxication and that, at most, he
should only be found guilty of manslaughter;
(3)

the Appellant asserted the defense that he did not

participate in the beating of the victim that took place outside
the trailer house; that the acts that occurred, arguably, rendered
the crime a second degree murder, rather than some lessor-included
offense;
(4) notice must be taken that not only was there conflicting
testimony from the prosecutions witnesses as to whether Appellant
was involved in the beating that took place outside of trailer
house #2, but also there was substantial evidence that Appellant
was severely intoxicated on the night the victim was beaten;
(5)

the lengthy nature (more than eight hours) of the jury's

deliberations; and
(6)

the obvious doubts of the jurors regarding the issue of

intent, which was evidenced by the jurors questions submitted to
the trial court regarding intent.
As a result the judge's denial of the motion for mistrial
constituted an abuse of discretion, and the prosecutors remarks
constituted plain error.

34

Bv

The Unsupported Assertion That Appellant and Codefendant
Conspired To Fabricate Their Accounts of The Events

The Hall, infra, case is instructive on the ethical
impropriety of the Box Elder County Attorney's repeated bald
assertions to the jury panel that the Appellant and co-defendant
Ray Cabututan were "protecting each other" by having discussed the
events prior to trial and

IT

com[ing] up with a story" by which

"they kind of weave the truth in with the lies". (T. 628-29).

In

the Hall case, the prosecutor argued to the jury that the
defendant had tampered with a witness who did not appear at trial.
The only evidence relating to the witness nonattendance was the
defendant's testimony that he was a friend of the witness and that
he had visited the witness about a week before trial to try to get
the witness to come to the trial. Hall at 584. The court found
that the inference of witness tampering could not be reasonably
deduced from what meager facts were in evidence, and therefore the
prosecution should not have made the assertions. Hall at 585.
Similarly, in the instant case, the only facts relating to
the purported collaboration of Appellant and Ray Cabututan were
that they are friends because of their employment, and that they
spent time together after the commission of the crime and before
trial.

From these meager facts, no inference of collaboration

could be reasonably adduced that would raise to the level of a
conspiracy of fabrication that could be reasonably argued to the
jury.
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The assertion of collaboration, like the assertion of witness
tampering in Hall goes to the integrity of the trial itself.

See

Hall, 419 F.2d at 585. When the improper and inflammatory remarks
were made by the Box Elder County Attorney, the trial court should
have, at a minimum, immediately sustained an objection and clearly
instructed the jury that the argument was not supported by the
evidence. That Appellant argues this was the appropriate curative
initiative that should have been taken by the trial court.
Again, the trial court abused its discretion by taking no remedial
action and denying Appellan's motion for a mistrial. (T. 669-671).
Furthermore, such a blunt assertion of a fact, not in evidence,
nor reasonably deducible from facts in evidence constitutes plain
error.

See United States v Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d 35, 40-41

(7th Cir. 1968); United States v Fearns, 501 F.2d 486, 489 (7th
Cir. 1974).

The prosecutor violated the fundamental rule, known

to every lawyer, that closing argument is Limited to the facts in
evidence.

This underhanded attack on Appellant's credibility

during closing argument was made for the sole purpose to undermine
confidence in the jury process since Appellant's credibility was
crucial to his defenses of incapacity to form the requisite intent
due to voluntary intoxication, self-defense, and lack of
participation in the beating that occurred outside the trialer.

36

C.

Repeated Opinions of the Veracity of Appellant and

Codefendant

Plain error was also committed by the prosecutor

by labelling the Appellant and the co-defendant Ray Cabututan as
"liars11, and repeatedly expressing its opinion to the jury panel
that they were "lying", or "not telling the truth" Cf., State v
Miller, 157 S.E.2d 335, 345 (N.C. 1967) (new trial granted because
of numerous prosecutorial errors, including calling a witness a
liar and expressing an opinion about a witness1 veracity); State v
Reed, 684 P.2d 699, 702-03 (Wash. 1984) (defendant denied right to
fair trial by, among other things, prosecution's repeatedly
calling defendant a "liar" and asserting its personal opinion of
credibility of a witness).

In Miller the court reasoned:

"...the trial judge should not permit counsel in his
argument's to indulge in vulgarities, he should,
therefore, refrain from abusive, vituperative, and
opprobrious language, or from indulging in invectives
or from aking any statements or reflections which have
no place in argument but are only calculated to cause
prejudice...it is the duty of judge to interfere
when the remarks of counsel are not warranted by the
evidence, and are calculated to mislead or prejudice
the jury
" (at 345-46).
On at least eight occasions the prosecution expressed its
opinion as to the lack of veracity of the Appellant and the
co-defendant Ray Cabututan labelling them as liars (T. 617, 627,
628, 631, 634, 635, 667). The Box Elder County Attorney should
have limited his remarks to the evidence adduced at trial and
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argued why the jury should not believe Appellant and co-defendant,
because, among other reasons, ,f[q]uite frequently conflicting
evidence in a case is not due to lying but to an honest mistake or
other factors ...."

Id. at 345.

The trial court, at the time

these prejudicial remarks were made, should have been aware that
they constituted errors and taken swift, immediate curative
action.
One of the most inflammatory statements occurred when the
Box Elder County Attorney stated to the jury panel11
"It's interesting to note that [Ray Cabututan's] story and
this defendant's story mesh fairly well. Why do you
think that is? You know, it's almost as if maybe they've
talked about this and perhaps come up with a story. It's
interesting to note that neither of them really involves
the other in their stories. You notice that they kind of
weave the truth in with the lies. If you notice lots of
liars do it, they won't tell a whole lie, not have any of
the truth because no one will believe that. So what you
do is mix a little truth in with the lie and you hope
that somebody will buy it. That's exactly what they did
in this case". (T. 576, 635)
That line of argument, was in essence, the unfounded
conspiracy to lie theory propounded to the jury panel by the Box
Elder County Attorney that was not supported by the evidence.
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D.

Referencing Codefendant1s Conviction For Same Offense

Another noteworthy prejudicial prosecutorial error occurred
when the Box Elder County Attorney twice referred to the fact that
the co-defendant Ray Cabututan, was convicted of second degree
murder at his separate trial. (T. 576, 635). In United States v
Austin 786 F.2d 986, 991 (10th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v
Griffin, 778 F.2d 707, (11th Cir. 1985) the court held: "Due to
the extreme and unfair prejudice suffered by defendants in similar
situations, courts and prosecutors generally are forbidden from
mentioning that a codefendant has either pled guilty or been
convicted11, (at 710).

Numerous courts have held that

prosecutorial references made to the fact of a conviction or
guilty plea of a co-defendant or co-conspirator constitute plain
error.

See, Austin, 786 F.2d at 992; United States v Miranda, 593

F.2d 590, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1979).

Like the prosecuting attorney

in the Miranda case, the Box Elder County Attorney not only
improperly urged the jury to consider co-defendants conviction as
proof of Appellant's guilt, but the argument made was improper
because it was based upon evidence not in the record.

See Austin

at 594 and further, inferentially, was made to the jury as some
evidence that the Appellant too must be guilty because of his
association with Ray Cabatutan who had already been convicted.
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It is fundamental criminal law and axiomatic thereto that the
prosecution may not refer to facts not presented as evidence, as
was done here, and then let the jury draw the prejudicial
conclus ion that Ray Cabatutan, a convicted felon, in concert with
the Appellant killed Mike Ramirez.

On two occasions the

prosecution informed the jury of the fact that co-defendant Ray
Cabututan had raised the identical defense of self-defense that
was raised by Appellant,

The Box Elder County Attorney argued to

the jury:
"Why should we believe the eyewitnesses over the
defendant and Mr. Cabututan? In the instructions, the
judge told you that you can take into consideration of
course the witness1 interest in the case. What
interest does this defendant have? Obvoiusly he does
not want to be convicted of this crime. He has a very
great interest in not telling you the truth on the
stand. What interest did Mr. Cabututan have? He had
the same interest in lying as did this defendant.
Remember, Mr. Cabututan raised basically the same
defenses; I did it in self-defense. Are you going to
believe him? Remember, Mr. Cabututan was convicted of
second degree murder11. (T. 634-35)
The remarks made by the Box Elder County Attorney were
prejudicial by labelling Appellant and Mr. Cabututan as '"liars"
and suggesting to the jury that they should reject Appellant's
self-defense claim and convict him of second degree murder upon
the premise that since Ray Cabututanfs self-defense claim was
rejected and he was convicted, inferentially so should the jury
convict the Appellant.
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E.

Comparing The Strength of the Evidence to That of Other

gases

The Box Elder County Attorney later concluded his

closing argument by making yet another extremely prejudicial
reference to evidence that was not in the record.

He stated:

"it's rare that you get a murder with eyewitnesses. You
can't get much more than eyewitnesses, physical
evidence, and expert testimony, and you've got all three,
ladies and gentlemen". (T. 688)
The prosecution made a comparable prejudicial remark in its
opening statement. (T. 36). The implication made was that the
evidence against Appellant was much stronger than that introduced
against most other defendants in murder cases because here, unlike
other murder cases, he had tried, you had eyewitnesses and was
improperly based upon the prosecutor's personal experiences which
may not be considered by the jury. Where similar comments were
made, the Miranda court found plain error in the prosecution's
alluding to the fact that the co-defendant had been convicted on
much weaker evidence than the evidence introduced against
defendant.
F.

Misstating the Testimony Regarding Appellant's

Intoxication

The Box Elder County Attorney also committed plain

error by misstating the evidence relating to the crucial issue of
Appellant's level of intoxication.

See United States v Brainard,

690 F.2d 1117, 1122-23 (4th Cir. 1982) (prosecutor committed plain
error in misquoting defendant in regards to the only disputed
issue); Fearns, 501 F.2d at 489 (plain error to state facts not in
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evidence); Guajardo-Melendez, 401 F.2d at 40-41 (plain error to
state facts not in evidence).

The Box Elder County Attorney

stated to the jury the following in his closing argument:
M

But no one, other than this defendant, says he was so
drunk that he couldnft form the intent to [commit the
crime]. As a matter of fact, he seems to move just
fine as far as Eddie's concerned and as far as Richard
Anderson;s concerned and as far as Eric Tilley1s
concerned, he's doing just fine....everybody who
saw him after [drinking] didn't notice any staggering,
slurred speech, anything like that". (T. 630, 667)
In point of fact, as testified to in the trial, neither Eddie
Apadaca, nor Richard Anderson, nor Eric Tilley testified that
Appellant seemed to be moving, "just fine or that they did not
notice any staggering or slurred speech".

To the contrary,

Richard Anderson testified Appellant was drunk; Eddie Apadaca
testified Appellant did not seem quite drunk, and lastly Eric
Tilley stated he could not tell if the defendants were drunk, but
figured they were drunk. (T. 103, 136, 140, 160, 173). In State v
Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1124 (UT 1982) the Utah Supreme Court in
addressing the issue of harmless error stated:
"Since the error identified above affected the
defendants sixth amendment right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, it can be held harmless onLy
if this court is 'able1 to declare a belief that it is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt", (at 1124)
The State of Utah has the burden of establishing that the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
770 P.2d 116, 121 n.8 (UT 1989).
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See State v Verde,

G.

Disparaging the Legitimate Defense Strategy of Admitting

to a Lesser-Included Offense

The prosecutions diparagement of

the legitimate defense strategy of admitting a lesser degree of
guilt and seeking acquittal of the higher degree also exceeded the
bounds of permissible argument.
A.2d at 258.

See Commonwealth v Gilman, 368

In Gilman the prosecution improperly described such

a defense strategy as an attempt to "sneak out11 with a lesser
verdict.

In this case, the Box Elder County Attorney improperly

ridiculed Appellant's defense strategy by stating; "obviously,
this defendant would love to be convicted of something less than
second

degree

murder...." (T. 662).

In sum, "sneak out" with a

lesser verdict.
H.

Comments Made By The Box Elder County Attorney That Were

Only Calculated To Cause Prejudice
Other comments were made by the Box Elder County Attorney
during the trial which were specifically calculated to cause jury
prejudice and as a result, it is argued, they too constituted
error.

The Box Elder County Attorney stated:

(a)

"At the beginning of this case, defense counsel told you

that his client was trying to help the decedent, Mike Ramirez.
After hearing the evidence, I would submit to you that if he was
trying to help him, it was just to help him out of this life and
nothing else".
(2)

(T. 617).

"[This defendant is] out there just having a good old

time beating that man...." (T. 630).
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I.

Vouching For the Credibility of a Frosecution Witness

Finally, the prosecution committed plain error in vouching
for the credibility of Richard Anderson, (T. 665) , see Untied
States v Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 143 (10th Cir. 1974), and otherwise
continually interjecting his personal opinions on such matters
regarding Richard Andersonfs credibility. (T. 625, 627, 629, 631,
632, 633, 636, 663, 664, 667). It was prejudicial error for the
Box Elder County Attorney to inject his personal opinion regarding
Richard Anderson's credibility, thereby clearly and improperly
intruding upon the jury's exclusive function of evaluating the
credibility of witnesses.

In such a case, without the court

immediately intervening and taking curative action in regard to
the Box Elder County Attorney vouching for the credibility of a
witness, a jury has no choice but to give such statements full
credibility to the statements made, since they came through
unchallenged by and through the power and prestige of the office
of the Box Elder County Attorney. See Gilman, 368 A.2d at 258-59.
As previously noted, it has been firmly established by case law
that a prosecutor may not express his personal opinion regarding a
defendants guilt, credibility or trial strategy. Id. at 258.
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J. CUMULATIVE ERROR
Even assuming, argumento, that none of the foregoing
substantial errors, in and of themselves, constituted reversible
error, the cumulative impact of the errors prejudiced Appellant's
right to a fair trial and thus constituted reversible error.
State v Rammel, 721 P.2d 498, 501-02 (UT 1986).

See

There are

striking similarities between this case and the Gilman and Reed
cases previously cited, where, in each case, numerous
prosecutorial errors were found to have denied the defendants
right to a fair trial. Gilman 368 A.2d at 259; Reed, 684 P.2d at
701-703.
Like the Gilman case, the trial of this case involved the
following prosecutorial errors:
(1)

disparaging a legitimate defense strategy of admitting a

lesser-included offense;
(2)

stigmatizing the defendant with prejudicial labels; that

is a criminal and liar;
(3)

improper expressions of personal beliefs as to the

defendants guilt and credibility; and
(4) appealing to the jury's passions and prejudice by
stating to the jury that; "At the beginning of this case, defense
counsel told you that his client was trying to help the decedent,
Mike Ramirez. After hearing the evidence, I would submit to you
that if he was trying to help him, it was just to help him out of
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this life and nothing else[;]", and "[this defendant is] out
there just having a good old time beating that man ...."

In

Gilman the prosecution stated that the defendant beat the victim
"like a dog .. until there were no more groans or moans, coming
out of that human body".

368 A.2d at 259.

Like the Reed case, the trial of the present case involved
the following facts:
(1)

the prosecutor expressed his personal beliefs as to the

defendant's guilt and credibility, including calling the defendant
a liar on numerous occasions;
(2)

a crucial defense was raised that the defendant, due to

severe intoxication, was incapable of forming the requisite intent
to commit the highest degree of murder charged;
(3)

the prosecutor's comments struck directly at the

evidence which supported the defendants intoxication defense by
attacking its credibility by improper means; and
(4)

the State's assertion that the defendant had the

necessary criminal intent to commit a homicide was not, contrary
to the State's assertions, overwhelming.
Both individually and cumulatively the numerous plain errors
made by the Box Elder County Attorney require that the court
reverse Appellant's conviction.
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POINT II
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, A FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND EQUAL
PROTECTION BY VAPIOUS REVERSIBLE ERRORS COMMITTED
BY THE TRIAL COURT.
Appellant asserts that the facts of this case affirmatively
demonstrate that the Appellant did not receive effective
assistance of counsel, a fair trial, due process of law, or equal
protection under the law in violation of his United States
Constitutional guarantees of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
and State of Utah constitutional right as guaranteed by Article I
Section 12. The only issue is whether the reversible error should
be attributed to the trial court, or Appellant's trial counsel.
Jack H. Molgard or both.
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Ake v Oklahoma
strongly supports the conclusion that the trial court was the
erring party in this trial. 470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S Ct. 1087.
1092-98, 84 L Ed. 2d 53 (1985).

In Ake the United States Supreme

Court held that a state is required to provide an indigent
defendant with the assistance of a psychiatrist to support his
insanity defense based, in part, upon the following reasoning:
"The Court has long recognized that when a State brings
its judicial power to bear on in indigent defendant in
a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure
tEat the defendant has a fair opportunity to present
his defense. This elementary principle, grounded in
significant part on the Fourteenth Amendments due
process guarantee of fundamental fairness, derives from
tEe belief that justice cannot be equal, where, simply
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as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial
proceeding in wnich his liberty is at stake.. . .To
implement this principle, we have focused on
identifying the "basic tools of an adequate defense or
appeal", and we have required that such tools be
provided to those defendants who cannot afford to pay
for them...Three factors are relevant to this
determination. The first is the private interest that
will be affected by the action of the State. The
second is the governmental interest that will be
affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third
is the probable value of the additional or substitute
procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if
those safeguards are not provided.
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal
proceeding that places an individual's life or liberty
at risk is almost uniquely compelling....At the
same time, it is difficult to identify any interest of
the State, other than that in its economy, that weighs
against recognition of this right....We therefore
conclude that the governmental interest in denying Ake
lERe assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in
Tight of the compelling interest of Both the state and
the individual in accurate dispositions".
470 U.S. at 76-79, 105 S. Ct. at 1092-94 (citations omitted;
emphasis added).
The Court then cited to numerous state statues, including
Utah Code Anno. §77-32-1, and other court decisions which
recognized an indigent defendants right to the assistance of a
psychiatrist's expertise as reflecting:
"[the] reality ... that when the State has made the
defendant's mental condition relevant to this criminal
culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the
assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial of the
defendants ability to marshall his defense".
470 U.S. at 80, 105 S. Ct. at 1095. From these strong judicial
pronouncements it is not difficult to conclude that the trial
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court here violated Appellants Federal and State constitutional
rights to a fair trial, where as here, the Appellantfs state of
mind, compounded by excessive drinking, should have been properly
evaluated by a psychiatrist in light of the fact the Appellant was
a chronic alcholic and presented to the jury for its
deliberations.
A.

Belated Appointment of a Private Investigator To Assist

The Appellant
The trial court after being requested, initially refused to
appoint, and then reluctantly and belatedly appointed a private
investigator to assist Appellant's trial counsel, Jack H. Molgard,
in pretrial investation and preparation, thus prejudicing
Appellant's right to a fair trial and requiring reversal of his
conviction.

Factually, the prejudice occurred as follows: On

October 31, 1989, Appellant's appointed trial counsel, Jack H.
Molgard, made an oral motion for the appoitnment of a private
investigator to assist him in pretrial investigation and
preparation.
1990.

The circuit court denied the motion on November 3,

(R.10-11, 24). On November 20, 1989, seventeen days later,

Appellant and the co-defendants filed with the District Court a
written Motion For Appointment of Private Investigator for
Discovery and preparation of Defendant's cases pursuant to U.C.A.
77-32-1(3) . Minimum standards provided by County for defense of
indigent defendants.

(R. 14-18).

The District Court trial judge

did not enter an Order appointing a private investigator for
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Appellant until January 17, 1990, more than two months after the
initial request for a private investigator and less than three
weeks before the trial date of February 5, 1990. (R. 197-198)
(Emphasis Added).
U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) statutorily requires each county to provide
indigent persons with the investigatory and other facilities
necessary to prepare a due process of law defense. Moreover, an
indigent defendant has a right, cognizable by the Federal
constitution, to the appointment of an investigator or expert at
State expense to assist in the preparation and presentation of his
defense.

Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th Ed.) §414. The State

of Utah's duty to provide an indigent with the means for an
appropriate defense stems from a just interplay of the
constitutional right to counsel, to a fair trial, and due process
of law.

State v Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966).

See also, Ake,

470 U.S. 68, 76-87, 105 S Ct. 1087, 1092-98. As in the Ake case
supra., the governmental interest in denying the assistance
requested to save some money is not substantial in light of the
compelling interest of both the state and the individual in a fair
trial.

Obviously, the use of a private investigator to perform

certain duties that the attorney would otherwise have to perform
usually is cost effective for the State of Utah, in that valuable
and costly attorney billable time is not wasted on work that
otherwise a competent investigator would normally do.
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Like the Ake case, U.C.A. 77-32-1(3) manifests the value and
importance attributed to providing indigent defendants with the
assistance requested, namely private investigatory assistance, at
least in the State of Utah.

The facts of this case clearly

demonstrate that a grave risk of a denial of due process of law
existed if such private investigatory assistance was not rendered,
especially where, as here, the criminal charge made were extremely
grave and involved many conflicting versions made by eyewitnesses,
and a factual issue was raised in regard to the lighting at the
s^ene of the crime which affected the eyewitnesses ability to
perceive the beating, and who was involved in the fatal beating.
For example, the State of Utah notified Appellant's trial counsel
that there would be twenty or more witnesses involved. The various
written and recorded statements of Don Brown, the State's three
key eyewitnesses, Richard Anderson, Eric Tilley, and Eddie
Apadaca, as well as another eyewitness, Sherman Gallardo, who
disappeared prior to the preliminary hearing, contained numerous
conflicting and different statements of fact.

Because of the

number of witness statements taken; the conflicting factual
versions contained therein; the discrepancies between the
witnesses' stories and Appellant's recollection of the events, it
was necessary to the preparation of an adequate defense that a
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private investigator be appointed to assist in interviewing the
witnesses; to point out inconsistencies to the witnesses, and
attempt to decipher the truth prior to the preliminary hearing
held on December 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd of 1989. Of
particular importance, Eric Tilley had stated that he saw only
three individuals, Billy Cayer, Ray Cabututan, and either Don
Brown or the Appellant standing around Mike Ramirez when the door
to trailer house #1 was first opened, whereas in contradiction
Richard Anderson stated he saw all four men at that time, Richard
Anderson's account of the Appellant's involvement in the fight
also differed markedly from that of Appellant.
The Utah Supreme Court has rightfully recognized that "the
preliminary hearing is an important step in the criminal process
in that it serves as both a discovery device and a means to
preserve evidence for trial."
(Utah 1988).

State v Neeley, 748 P.2d 1091, 1095

Once a witness testifies under oath at a preliminary

hearing they are less likely to change their stories if presented
with inconsistencies in their statements, or discrepancies between
their testimony and that of others.

If a preliminary hearing is

to fully and effectively serve its purposes, the Appellant must
have the opportunity to interview witnesses prior thereto, so that
witnesses may take account of discrepancies and inconsistencies
before their testimony is preserved, and as it were cast in stone.
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If a private investigator had been appointed by the Circuit
Court Judge and had been available to take pictures of the crime
scene prior to the preliminary hearing, these pictures could have
been shown to the witnesses to facilitate their recollection of
exactly who and what they were able to see or not see from various
vantage points• Most notably, Richard Anderson's testimony
regarding the events occurring behind the amphibian is highly
suspect, since arguably the amphibian would have obstructed his
view.

The Appellant's defense was also hampred by the lack of

information regarding the background of Mike Ramirez and his
character for violence and all of the key witnesses, all
transients, that could have been investigated by a private
investigator. Without such information, Appellant was severely
restricted in challenging their credibility, or in showing that
the victim possessed a violent character in support of the
Appellant's contention that he was acting in self-defense.

The

problem of the use and need for a private investigator was obvious
at the time of the preliminary hearing and became more acute as
the matter neared the trial date. A motion was made to the trial
court for the appointment of a private investigator on November
20, 1989 but one was not appointed until January 17, 1990 three
weeks before the trial date of February 5, 1990.
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Such belated

appointment had a devastating effect on the ability of defense
counsel to prepare, and to make the trial a truly powerful truth
seeking adversarial contest.
The foregoing leaves little doubt that both the Appellant's
State and Federal due process of law constitutional right was
violated, requiring this court to reverse his conviction by the
belated appointment, by the trial court, of a private investigator
to assist the Appellant in his preparation.
B*
Assistance

The Denial of Appellant's Motion For Psychiatric
Appellant argues the First Judicial District Court

further violated the Appellantfs United States Sixth and
Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment guaranteed rights and State of
Utah constitutional rights under Article I Section 12 of the Utah
Constitution by denying the Appellant's Motion To Appoint a
Psychiatrist and Expert Personnel and Motion To Allow
Psychological Testing and Mental Evaluation.

On January 16, 1990,

thirteen days after the District Court Arraignment of the
Appellant on January 3, 1990, Jack H. Molgard belatedly filed with
the trial court the motion along with a Notice of Intent To Call
Psychiatric and Other Expert Witnesses and a Notice of Intent To
Claim Lack of Capacity to Form Intent made for the exclusive
purpose of establishing, by expert psychiatric testimony, that the
Appellant was unable to form the necessary intent to commit second
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degree murder because of Appellant1s voluntary intoxication.
185-86, 189-90, 194-96).

(R.

The trial court denied Appellantfs

multiple motions, and would not allow any expert testimony on the
Appellant's ability to form the requisite criminal mens rea
intent, because the trial court believed that the motions and
notices had not been filed timely; that is as soon as practicable
after the time of arraignment, as required by Utah Code Ann.
§77-14-3(1)(2). Mental Illness Defense Notice Requirement.

(R.

239; January 18, 1990) (Hearing Transcript, 18-19, 23-24, 44).
In $o ruling, the trial court committed error since it was a
denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution for the State to deny
an indigent defendant the needed assistance of a psychiatric
expert, where as here, the defendant's mental state at the time of
the offense was a substantial factor in his defense. See Ake, 470
U.S, 68, 76-87, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 1092-98. C.f., State v Woods,
648 P.2d 71, 88 (Utah 1981) ("The refusal to grant an indigent
defendant's timely motion for psychiatric assistance in a capital
case is an abuse of discretion....It is also a denial of due
process"). The following mens rea, mental state required by Utah
Code Ann. §76-5-203(1) for a conviction of guilty of second degree
murder are stated as:
(1)

intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another;
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(2)

intending to cause serious bodily injury to another;

(3)

commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that
causes the death of another;

(4)

acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved
indifference to human life engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby
causes the death of another.

See State v Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 263-65 (Utah 1988).

In this

case, expert psychiatric testimony was crucial to the central
issue of whether the Appellant, due to voluntary intoxication, was
unable to form the requisite intent to commit the homocide.
While the fundamental right to due process of law may be
waived, such waiver may not be presumed from the untimely filing
of a motion absent a showing that the waiver was knowingly and
voluntarily made.

State v McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah

1980); State v Studham, 655 P.2d 669, 670 (Utah 1982).

In

McCximber the trial court denied defendant's motion for severance
of various counts of the indictment due to the defendant's failure
to timely file the motion within the statutory time limits.
at 356.

Id.

Because joinder of the counts jeopardized the defendant's

fundamental right of due process of law, and since it was not
affirmatively demonstrated that defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his rights, the Utah Supreme Court declared
that the denial of the motion, "must be regarded as an abuse of
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discretion[, ]fl Id. McCumber at 356 requiring a reversal of
defendant's conviction.

C^f, State v Miller, 677 P.2d 1129 (Utah

1984) (the exclusion of expert psychiatric testimony on the issue
of intent was found to be reversible error); State v Sessions, 645
P.2d 643, 645 (Utah 1982) ("basic rules of evidence pertaining to
materiality and relevance require that a defendant have the right
to adduce
evidence which would tend to disprove the existence of specific
intent").

The facts in this case do not demonstrate that the

Appellant knowingly and voluntarily waived his due process right
to the assistance of a psychiatric expert by failing to comply
with the statutory time limits. To the contrary, at the time the
I
motions and notices were filed, Jack H. Molgard, Appellant's trial
counsel, was unaware of the existance of U.C.A. 77-14-3 and the
time limits contained therein. As such, the Appellant may now be
asked by the Court to pay the heavy price of waiver, because of
the error of his counsel regarding knowing the statutory terms of
U.C.A. 77-14-3 and its time limitations.

Consequently, the trial

court's denial of Appellant's motions jeopardized the Appellant's
due process rights because of his trial counsels negligent
attention to the pertinent statutory provision heretofore stated
and must be held to be reversible error.
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POINT 111
THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
CONTINUANCE CONSTITUTED A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND A VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The First Judicial District Court committed reversible error
by denying the Appellant's Motion for Continuance of the trial
date set. While the granting of a continuance is within the sound
discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will not be reversed
absent a clear abuse of discretion, an abuse may be found where a
party has made timely objections, given necessary notice and made
a reasonable effort to have the trial date reset for good cause,
as occurred in this criminal case.
750, 752 (Utah 1982).

State v Creviston, 646 P.2d

The denial of a motion for continuance may

also constitute reversible error on the ground that the denial
effectively obviated defendant's United States Constitutional
guarantee to effective assistance of counsel whereby counsel lacks
sufficient time to prepare his defense.

See Hintz v Beto, 379

F.2d 937, 942 (5th Cir. 1967) (among other things, the lawyer was
denied the opportunity to review and analyze a psychiatric
report).
On January 3, 1990, the trial court arraigned the Appellant
and scheduled the trial for February 5, 1990 through February 9,
1990, over the strong oral objections of Appellant's counsel.

In

denying the Motion For Continuance of trial date, the trial court
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failed to inquire as to the amount of time that Appellant's
counsel deemed necessary to prepare for trial, or to schedule a
pretrial conference, as provided for by Rule 13 of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure to address preparation and other relevant
trial issues.

Shortly thereafter, on January 10, 1990, Appellant

filed with the trial court a written Motion for Continuance of the
trial date. (R. 146-148) . Among the numerous grounds stated for a
continuance of the trial date cited in Appellant's motion, was the
pertinent fact that Appellant's counsel had not yet received a
copy of the 949 pages of transcript of the preliminary hearing for
counsel examination.

In addition to the necessity of reviewing

the voluminous preliminary hearing transcript, Appellant's
counsel, during the short time remaining prior to trial, was faced
with the following preparatory trial responsibilities that
required sufficient attorney time for: (1) the need to review and
carefully analyze the extraordinary amounts of physical,
documentary, and expert evidence, including the statements of
various witnesses; (2) the need to review and analyze, not only by
counsel, but also by experts assisting counsel, documentary
evidence generated by the State's medical examiner and forensic
blood expert, which the prosecution had agreed to provide to
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Appellant's counsel at the preliminary hearing, but which
Appellant's counsel had not received as of the date of the Motion
for Continuance on January 10, 1990. (R. 147; Preliminary Hearing
Transcript (hereinafter

ff

PH", Vol, III, p. 210); (3) interview

potential witnesses, including Pat Bentzley and Darrell Green, the
Appellant's boss and a supervisor at Western Brine Shrimp Company,
who each, according to the Appellant, at least, would have
testified that Appellant was a good worker and would otherwise
provide good character testimony; (4) the need to consult with and
prepare the trial testimony Dr. Finkle, the court appointed
toxicologist expert, on the effects of alcohol on an individual
who had consumed as much alcohol as the Appellant had on the night
of October 25, 1989; (5) the need to obtain accurate photographic
evidence of the crime scene that would depict the lines of sight
of the various state witnesses, and the dimness of the lighting
from the trailer houses at night; and (6) Additionally, the need
to consult with a psychiatric expert on the Appellant's ability to
form the requisite intent for the charged crime of second degree
murder.

The time constraints imposed by the trial court in

denying Appellants Motion For a Continuance of trial date
adversely impaired the Appellant's United States Constitutional
and Constitution of Utah guarantee to effective assistance of
counsel and to a fair trial, at least in the following;
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Appellant's counsel did not have sufficient time to review, in any
depth, the preliminary hearing transcripts or the written
statements and transcribed interviews of various key witnesses.
As discussed below, counsel was thus unable to highlight to the
jury, and bring out at trial, the numerous discrepancies made
between the witnesses stories, and between each witnesses own
statements given to the police or testified to at the preliminary
hearing, and testified to at trial.

Clearly, reversible error was

committed as a result of the court in denying Appellants motion to
continue the trial date to allow defense counsel to adequately
prepare for trial; especially where the charges made were so
graye.
POINT IV
DEFICIENCIES IN APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE
RESULTED IN THE DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
If Appellant is able to demonstrate to this court that his
trial counsel rendered a deficient performance in some
demonstrable manner, and that a reasonable probability exists that
except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been
different, then his conviction should be reversed on the grounds
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
645, 646 (Utah 1985).

State v Geary, 707 P.2d

Reversal of the conviction is warranted
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because Appellantfs trial counsel, Jack H. Molgard, failed to
adequately investigate and prepare for trial; did not know of the
statutority time limitations required to timely file a motion and
notice necessary to obtain the assistance of a psychiatrist, and
failure to adequately cross-examine the State's three eyewitnesses
for the purpose of highlighting, for the jury, contradictions
within their individual versions of the facts. Deficient attorney
performance is clear from the record, which prejudiced the
Appellant's right to a fair trial, in that defense counsel Jack H.
Molgard failed to object to the numerous errors committed by the
prosecution during closing argument, and to call character
witnesses on Appellant's behalf.

It is reasonably probable that

Appellant would have been acquitted or convicted of a
lesser-included offense, such as manslaughter or negligent
homicide had counsel for the Appellant been adequately prepared,
conducted adequate cross examinations, and had filed a timely
Motion For Appointment For a Psychiatrist to evaluate the
Appellant. Where nearly identical deficiencies in counsel's
performance were found, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the defendant was denied effective
assistance of counsel and was prejudiced thereby in violation of
his United States Contitution Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
United States ex rel. Washington v Maroney, 428 F.2d 10 (3rd Cir.
1970).
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A.
Assistance

Failure To Timely File the Motions For Psychiatric
If this court finds that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion and thus commit reversible error in denying
the Appellant the assistance of a psychiatrist to make findings
and testify as an expert withness regarding Appellant's mental
state, then surely Jack H. Molgard committed reversible error in
being woefully ignorant of the time limitations set by U.C.A.
77-14-3 "Mental Illness Defense Notice Requirement" and thus
failing to timely file a motion for appointment of a psychiatrist.
Defense counsel's untimely filing of the motion for appointment of
a psychiatrist amounted to a failure to make the motions at all in
the context of this case.

In a number of cases the failure to

maki particular motions or objections has been held to constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring reversal of a
defendants conviction.

See 9 Fed. Proc, L Ed §22:403.

The Utah Supreme Court has stated that defense counsels
ignorance of the law which results in a withdrawal of a crucial
defense is tantamount to ineffective assistance of counsel.
v McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976).

State

The Appellant's long history

of sustained alcohol abuse, his trial testimony regarding the
large quantities of alcohol he consumed the night of the homicide,
the statements of the State's own witnesses that the Appellant was
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drunk, and Dr. Finklefs testimony regarding the effects of alcohol
on awareness and decision making laid the framework for
Appellant's voluntary intoxication defense.

But without the

psychiatric testimony to assist the jury in filling in the gaps
and drawing conclusions from the evidence regarding the mental
state of the Appellant due to the consumption of alcohol, the
defense was effectively withdrawn from the jury due to counsel
Molgard's ignorance of U.C.A. 77-14-3. Mental Illness defense
notice requirement.

The situation is analogous to claiming

insanity as a defense, providing the jury with a narration of the
events and any unusual behavior, and then failing to produce a
psychiatrist to explain the mental workings behind the behavior.
Confidence in this case verdict was undermined, where the proper
framework for a crucial defense of voluntary intoxication was
laid, through the testimony of Dr. Finkel, but the next logical
step; essential psychiatric testimony was not presented because
defense counsel failed to timely file a Motion For Appointment of
Psychiatrist.
In two similar cases from other state jurisdictions, the
defendants convictions were reversed by the state high court upon
the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel in that
defendants counsel failed to present psychiatric testimony on the
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effects of alcohol on the ability to form the requisite intent.
Commonwealth v Beatty, 419 A.2d 711 (Pa.Super. 1980); State v
Hester, 341 N.E.2d 304 (Ohio 1976).

In Hester, the court noted:

"although a record may contain sufficient evidence that
counsel has been in fact incompetent (or competent),
evidence determinative of this question is [sic]
usually dehors the record and generally, an
evidentiary hearing or summary judgment procedure is
required", (at 308)
At g. minimum, the Court should remand this case for an evidentiary
hearing on the issue of whether or not Appellant received
constitutionally required effective assistance of counsel.
B.

Failure To Adequately Prepare; Especially For

Cross-Examination of Eye-Witnesses
Defense counsel Jack H. Molgard did not adequately prepare in
at teast the following: He failed to interview the State's
witnesses prior to the preliminary hearing, to obtain adequate
photographic evidence of the crime scene that depicted the lines
of 4ight of the various witnesses, and of the dimness of the
lighting from the trailer houses at night, to obtain background
information on the victim regarding his character for violence and
the State's eyewitnesses, and to review the preliminary hearing
transcript and statements of the witnesses. Due to his lack of
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preparation Appellant's attorney was not able to conduct a
well-prepared, extensive and incisive cross-examinations of the
State's three eyewitnesses.

Incisive, factually penetrating

cross-examinations was critical to the Appellant's defense in
light of the substantial discrepancies between the accounts of the
eyewitnesses, the Appellant, and Ray Cabututan found in the
voluminous written statements and transcribed interviews, nine
hundred and forty nine (949) page preliminary hearing transcript,
and trial testimony.

There were obvious eyewitness disagreements

and discrepancies concerning the degree of the Appellant's
involvement in the fight, the timing and nature of Appellant's
words and actions, and the ability of the witnesses to observe and
hear the events and properly identify persons from distances, in
dim lighting, with lines of sight cut off by doorways, trailers,
and amphibians, and with a loud generator operating nearby.
Numerous testimonial discrepancies were made from the record which
Jack H. Molgard failed to point out to the jury or draw out at
trial, including at least:
(1)

In his written statement, in his transcribed interview,

and at the preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca stated that the
Appellant was pretty loaded or drunk.

Whereas, in contravention

at trial, he said that the Appellant had been drinking, but did
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not seem quite drunk.

(PH. Vol I, 164-65; T. 103-04).

This

discrepancy was relevant to the Appellant's intoxication defense,
but was never pointed out to the jury.
(2) At the preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca said the wind
was pretty fierce and he could not hear from inside trailer house
#2 what was being said outside.

(PH. Vol. I, 183-84, 197). Eddie

Apadaca1s preliminary hearing testimony was not brought out at
trial, even though the ability of other witnesses to hear from the
trailer houses, statements allegedly made outside by the Appellant
was in issue and relevant to the Appellant's participation in the
fight.
(3) At the preliminary hearing, it came out that Eddie
Apadaca changed his story several times as to whether the
Appellant or Ray Cabututan said "forget him [Apadaca], let's go
bacl^ to the other guy". (PH., Vol. I, 207-208).

The alleged

statement, by implication, bears on the Appellant's involvement in
the fight, necessitated that the jury should have been made made
aware of Eddie Apadaca's confusion, but were not.
(4) At the preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca testified that
he discussed with Richard Anderson the events of the night of
Octdber 25, 1989, including what happened and what they saw, for
about twenty minutes at Apadacafs apartment sometime prior to the
preliminary hearing. Richard Anderson however denied discussing
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with Eddie Apadaca what happened that night, but admitted going to
Eddie Apadacafs apartment when confronted with Eddie ApadacaTs
testimony, but he continued to deny having any discussion
regarding what happened that night with Apadaca. (PH. Vol. I,
211-12; PH. Vol. Ill, 32, 76, 81, 107; PH. Vo. IV, 673-74).

This

impeachable testimony was not brought out at trial, despite the
fact that Px.ichard Anderson was by far the most important State eye
witness, whose credibility was central to the State of Utahfs case
in chief. Moreover, the testimony demonstrated that once Richard
Anderson had testified under oath to a fact he would not change
his testimony even when confronted with contradictory testimony or
evidence, thus evidencing the importance of Jack H. Molgard's
failure to interview Pvichard Anderson prior to the preliminary
hearing.
(5) At preliminary hearing, Eddie Apadaca testified that he
did not remember much of what happened in trailer #2; undoubtedly,
because of the blow to his head the night of October 25, 1989 and
the fact that Billy Cayer was mauling him as the events occurred
therein.

Eddie Apadaca also testified that when most everybody

was in trailer #2 Don Brown asked where the blood came from that
was on Eddie Apadaca1s long Johns that he was wearing at the time.
They then determined that the blood was coming from a cut on Billy
Cayer's hand. (PH. Vol. I, 215-17).

Additionally, on page 8 of

his written statement, Apadaca stated that "shit" was flying
everywhere in trailer #2.
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The statements of Eddie Apadaca also were never brought out
at trial, despite the fact that, at trial, Eddie Apadacafs account
of events in trailer #2 did not mesh with Appellant's account that
blows were exchanged by the Appellant and Mike Ramirez inside
trailer #2; that the blood on Appellant's clothes derived, at
least in part, from bleeding which occurred inside trailer #2;
that Appellant scraped his knuckles either when he hit Mike
Ramirez in trailer #2 or Eddie Apadaca, as he was leaving the
camp and stated that the Appellant's sole involvement in the fight
took place inside trailer house #2.
(6) At preliminary hearing, Eric Tilley testified that when
the door to trailer #1 was re-opened by Richard Anderson the fight
had ended, Mike Ramirez was standing up by himself, and then he
went back to his trailer, contrary to Richard Anderson's testimony
that a good part of the fight occurred after he opened the door.
(PH. Vol. II, 428-28, 439-40).

This impeachable contradictory

testimony was never brought out at trial, despite the grave doubt
it placed upon the veracity of Richard Anderson regarding the
events which occurred after the door was re-opened.
(7) At preliminary hearing, Eric Tilley testified that Eddie
Apadaca was chased out of camp by either Don Brown or the
Appellant at the same time, or immediately after Sherman Gallardo
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first opened the door to trailer house #1 (PH. Vol. II, 458, 460).
Eric Tilley's testimony contradicted Eddie Apadacafs statement
that Ray Cabututan started to chase him, and that the Appellant
said, "let him [Apadaca] go. letfs go back to the other guy11.
Because Eddie Apadaca never mentioned Don Brown being in the
vicinity when Eddie Apadaca was chased out of camp; Eric Tilley,
like Richard Anderson, must have heard the Appellant doing the
chasing.

Eric Tilley's testimony also contradicts Richard

Anderson's testimony that Eddie Apadaca was run out of camp prior
to the time the door was first opened.

Eric Tilley's testimony

supports the Appellant's testimony that he was busy chasing Eddie
Apadaca out of camp while Mike Ramirez was being beaten outside.
(8) At the preliminary hearing, Richard Anderson also
testified that Don Brown was standing at the head of Mike Ramirez
when the door to trailer #1 was first opened.

Similarly, Eric

Tilley said that the third person, who he could not identify for
certain as being either Don Brown or the Appellant, was standing
at the head of Mike Ramirez when the door was first opened. (PH.
Vol. II 439, 455; PH. Vol. IV, 679). The testimony of the
Appellant and Eric Tilly supports the position that it was Don
Brown, and not the Appellant, who was standing around Mike Ramirez
when the door was first opened.
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(9)

In Richard Anderson's transcribed interview in regard to

his ability to see, he states that he could not see how people
were dressed that night, as there was "just a little [of light]
coming out of trailer[.]".

He also states that Sherman Gallardo

saw Eddie Apadaca being run out of camp through the open door of
trailer house #1. (Transcribed interview of Anderson 2-3).

This

testimony further contradicts Richard Anderson's trial testimony
that there was adequate lighting, and that Eddie Apadaca was
chased away prior to the door being opened.

Furthermore, the

testimony supports the testimony of Eric Tilley and Appellant that
Appellant was chasing Eddie Apadaca as the fight was ongoing when
the door to trailer house #1 was opened.
(10) At the preliminary hearing, Richard Anderson repeatedly
admitted that he saw silhouettes when he opened the door, calling
into question his ability to identify the silhouettes, especially
giv£n the similar build and appearance of the Appellant and Don
Brown. (PH. Vol. I 110; PH. Vol IV 687, 689).
(11) At preliminary hearing, Richard Anderson testified that
he Observed the fight approximately a foot and one-half inside the
threshold of the trailer house door. (PH. Vol. Ill 56-57).

This

infprmation was relevant because Richard Anderson's ability to see
the events occurring at angles from the door i.e., in front of
trailer #2, may have been obstructed by the door frame.
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Defense counsel Molgardfs egregious failure to adequately
prepare, due in part by the trial courts failure to grant a
continuance of the trial date, so that he was able to bring out
these crucial facts on cross -examination and the implication of
the discrepancies was substantial error that undermined confidence
in the verdict, necessitating a reversal of Appellant's
conviction.
C.

Failure To Call Character Witnesses on Appellants Behalf

Defense counsel Jack H. Molgard also committed error, thereby
prejudicing Appellant's trial, by failing to call the Appellant's
supervisors to testify as to the Appellant's good character.
Maroney, 428 F.2d at 14-15.

See

These witnesses would have testified

that the Appellant was one of their best workers, and further that
he was anything but a trouble maker.

Despite Appellant's pretrial

request to Jack H. Molgard that they be called to testify, defense
counsel never called them as witnesses despite the obvious need
for character testimony.
D.

Failure To Object To Numerous Prosecutorial Errors

Finally, Appellant asserts his defense counsel was deficient
in his performance and prejudiced the trial to such an extent that
the verdict cannot be relied upon in producing a just result in
that he failed to object to the numerous prosecutorial errors set
forth above.

If the prosecutorial errors to which no objection

was raised are not found to be plain error, then the failures to
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object should be found to constitute ineffective assistance of
coutisel, since the errors cumulatively undermined confidence in
the verdict.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS
TO GUIDE THE JURY
During the jury's deliberations the jury submitted the
following three requests for further guidance from the trial
judge:
(1)

Instruction #15 No. 1 [pertaining to the definition of

intentionally].

The concluding words 'cause the result', does

'result' mean death or bodily injury or what?
(2)

"Do you have to intend to kill someone to be convicted

of second degree murder?"
(3)

"In the explanation of the act or cause of 2nd degree

murder, if you read the paragraphs a, b, c, and d is (a) a
statement of who the defendant is?
Is (b) to show how much injury is found and/or how the
person(s) inflicted the act of serious bodily injury?
Is (c) to show that a voluntary act or acts from (b) a link
to a conclusion?
Is (d) a conclusion that if b + c were done then d is a
result and/or conclusion of the above statements?
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Is the word did in (d) a conclusion that both b and c led to
a summary of the above para, (b) + (c)?ff (R. 298-99).
Instead of acting decisively in an appropriate judicial
manner to resolve the jury panels obvious confusion, the trial
judge, on all three occasions, tersely directed them to reread the
instructions already given.

In so doing, the trial judge

committed reversible error.

See State v Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 94-95

(Utah 1981); Price v Glosson Motor Lines, Inc., 509 F.2d 1033,
1036-38 (4th Cir. 1975); Walsh v Miehle-Goss-Dexter, Inc., 378
F.2d 409, 415 (3rd Cir. 1967).
In State v Couch, the refusal of the trial court to provide a
definition of the word "genitals" when requested to do so by the
jury in a forcible sodomy case was found to have plainly resulted
in a miscarriage of justice, thus constituting reversible error.
The court reasoned:
"Where the jury requests the instruction...it
is generally held error to refuse to provide a
definition, even where the word is a term of common
meaning11.
"Discharge of the jury's responsibility for drawing
appropriate conclusions from the testimony depended
on discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the
jury the required guidance by a lucid statement
of the relevant legal criteria. When a jury makes
explicit its difficulties a trial~judge should
clear them away with concrete accuracy^ (At 93-95)
(Emphasis Added)
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635 P.2d at 94 (quoting Bollenbach v United States, 326 U.S. 607,
612413, 66 S. Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed 350 (1946).

In this case, the

trial court erred in failing to define "result" as requested by
the jury and clearing away the confusion with "concrete accuracy".
The Walsh court also cited to the Bollenbach case in
declaring that where the jury makes known its difficulty, and then
requests further instructions on the law applicable as to an
important issue, the trial court does not fulfill its duty to the
jury to give supplemental instructions by the perfunctory act of
re-reading of the very instructions which may have led to the
difficulty.

In the present case, the trial court referred the

jury to instructions already given, not once, but on three
occasions, in violation of its duty to provide to the jury
concrete clarity and judicial direction on important issues
relevent to jury duty.
The trial court errors committed require reversal by the
Court since they plainly resulted in a miscarriage of justice
based upon the following: (1) the issue of intent was a central
question, given the evidence and Appellant's defenses of voluntary
intoxication and self-defense, and (2) all of the jury's request
for clarification indicate that the jury was struggling with at
least the element of intent.

In fact, the subsection beginning

with "Is (b) to show...[,]" evidences an apparent confusion with
the concept of intent with the concepts of actions and results of
actions.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL JUDGE DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL AND DUE
PROCESS BY ALLOWING THE JURY TO DELIBERATE FOR 8% HOURS
UNTIL 1:20 A.M.
After four full days of trial, the jury began deliberation at
approximately 5:00 p.m. on the fourth day.

The trial court then

permitted the jury to deliberate for eight and one-half hours,
after the fourth day of trial, until the early morning hour of
1:20 a.m. (T. 675). The Appellant is entitled to a trial by jury
which includes an independent decision by each of the jurors as to
the defendants guilt or innocence. While the court is given wide
discretion regarding the length of deliberation, that discretion
is abused if the defendant is deprived of the considered judgment
of each juror.

To believe that the entire jury could remain

engaged in the deliberation process for 8% hours after a full
fourth day trial stretches credulity.

It is unreasonable to

believe that all the jurors could have remained alert for that
length of time.

The memory and analytical skills of the jurors

would certainly begin to fade and the wills of any minority jurors
would be easily overborne after that length of jury deliberations.
The failure of the trial court to inquire whether the jury members
were tired at a reasonable earlier hour is to give too much
deference to those on the jury that wanted to get the job over and
done with at the expense of the Appellant.
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In Isom v State, 481 So.2d 820 (Miss. 1985), where the jury,
in a manslaughter trial, deliberated from approximately 3:30 p.m.
to 10:30 p.m. after 1% days of hearing the trial of the case,
where several jurors expressed a desire to recess deliberations,
and where the trial court sent the jury back for further
deliberations, at which time the jury returned a verdict in about
30 minutes, the time for continuous deliberation was held to be
excessive.

This court should hold as a matter of judicial

administration, if not Constitutional law, that keeping a jury in
deliberation continuously for 8% hours after the final day of
trial deprives the defendant of due process of law and a fair
trial by a jury of his peers under both the State of Utah and the
United States Constitution.
POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT ABSUED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING
TO ALLOW THE JURY TO VIEW THE CRIME SCENE.
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a
jur^ view of the crime scene. The trial court judge apparently
denied Appellant's motion because of the time and distance between
the courthouse. (1/18/90 hearing transcript at 10, 24-32); The
I
January 18, 1990 hearing transcript involving both Appellant's and
Ray Cabututan's case at 5-23 (Motion for jury view of crime
scene). (R. 236-38; Memorandum decisions denying jury view).
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Such a view would have assisted the jury in fulfilling their
fact finding duty by being better able to understand the
perceptual difficulties that the eyewitnesses in the case
encountered.

The crime took place near midnight in late October

in a rural area.
lights.

The only lighting was from dim trailer house

Only one witness, Richard Anderson, stated Appellant was

involved in the major part of the fight that occurred outside the
trailer house.

Richard Anderonsf testimony is inconsistent in

numerous aspects with his prior statements, and preliminary
hearing testimony and with the statements and testimony of other
witnesses.

His line of sight in all probability was also

obstructed by door frames and vehicles. With the verdict hinging
on such weak eyewitness testimony, it cannot be said that a
refusal to permit a jury view of the crime scene fell within the
trial courts sound judicial discretion.

Rather, such a crime

scene view would have contributed substantially to the
presentation of Appellant's defense based on inadequate
eyewitnesses identification of the Appellant.

An appropriate

ruling by this Court would be to reverse Appellant's cnoviction on
the ground that the trial court abused its sound discretion by not
permitting a jury view of the crime scene under Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure 17(i). The trial, and upon the unique
circumstances of this case.
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POINT VIII
THE NUMEROUS SUBSTANTIAL ERRORS COMMITTED AMOUNT
TO CUMMULATIVE ERROR
Even assuming that none of the foregoing substantial errors,
in and of themselves constituted reversible error, the cumulative
impact of each error prejudiced Appellant's right to a fair trial
thus constituting reversible error.
498, 501-02 (Utah 1986).

See State v Rammel, 721 P.2d

Confidence in the verdict is undermined,

at least to the extent that, in the absence of the cummulative
errors, a reasonable probability exists that Appellant would have
been convicted of one of the lesser-included offenses of
manslaughter or negligent homicide due to his voluntary
intoxication and lack of formation of the requisite intent to
commit second degree murder.
is warranted.

Under such circumstances, reversal

See State v Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989).
CONCLUSION

Appellant respectfully submits that, at a minimum, this Court
should remand these proceedings to the District Court for an
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether or not Appellant's
trial counsel failed to provide Appellant with effective
assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the United States
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Constitution Sixth Amendment and Constitution of Utah Article I
Section 12. However, Appellant submits that the more appropriate
remedy is for this Court to reverse his conviction and grant
Appellant a new trial because of the numerous substantial and
prejudicial errors which are apparent on the face of the record
which undermine confidence in the verdict.
Respectfully submitted this^^/

day of December, 1990.

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Respondent/Appellee
attorney, Office of Attorney General, R. Pa,ul Van Dam, State of
Utah, Governmental Affairs, Room 236, State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, UT 84114, this Z /

day of December, 1990.

80

